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Why We Keep Doing Business with
Doing-Business Jurisdiction
Mary Twitchelit
This Article discusses a change of heart I have had concern-
ing general jurisdiction. In the past, I have advocated cutting
back on "doing-business" general jurisdiction, limiting it to the
place of incorporation and the defendant's principal place of busi-
ness.1 My reason was simple: courts were using general jurisdic-
tion theory to reach defendants in cases in which such dispute-
blind jurisdiction was improper.2 Not only was this unfair to de-
fendants, but the practice interfered with the rational develop-
ment of both general and specific jurisdiction doctrines.
Rather than proposing a test modifying the reach of doing-
business jurisdiction, I suggested that we eliminate it entirely,
restricting general jurisdiction to the defendant's home-that is,
to its place of incorporation and principal place of business.' I
suggested this because there was no other place to draw a clear
line, and clarity seemed the best way around the problem I had
identified. As soon as general jurisdiction is extended to other
states where the defendant engages in commercial activities, it
becomes almost impossible to create a predictably useful body of
law.
This suggestion is very close to the jurisdictional plan pro-
posed in the preliminary draft of the Hague Convention on Juris-
diction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters.4 The Hague proposal allows suit on any claim in a defen-
dant's home state and provides for specific jurisdiction in other
t Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Thanks to Tom Cot-
ter and my research assistant Allen Winsor for their help with this Article.
1 Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv L Rev 610 (1988).
2 See id at 611-22, 633-43.
3 See id at 676.
4 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Art 4 ("Hague
Draft Proposal") (adopted Oct 30, 1999) available online at <http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/draft36e.html> (visited Oct 22, 2001).
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places in a limited number of circumstances.5 However, it specifi-
cally forbids jurisdiction "based on the carrying on of commercial
or other activities by the defendant in that State, except where
the dispute is directly related to those activities."6 I should be
pleased with this scheme, but in fact I am not. I am no closer to
locating a satisfactory test for doing-business jurisdiction than in
the past, but I am persuaded that we are not ready to give it up
entirely and probably should not do so even if we could.
This Article explores these misgivings and offers two sugges-
tions for a way out of the problem. Part I addresses the underly-
ing rationale for doing-business jurisdiction, arguing that schol-
ars and the Supreme Court have failed to settle on a coherent
view of this jurisdictional doctrine. Part II shows how this lack of
theoretical coherence has led to serious problems in the applica-
tion of the doctrine, specifically in terms of the malleability and
unpredictability of the standard and the distortion produced by
the fact that claims are often related to the defendant's forum
activities. After Part III describes the advantages of this loose
approach, Part IV weighs the disadvantages suffered by foreign
commercial defendants and explores the solution offered by the
Hague conference draft. Part V then considers the alternative
solutions which might be more in keeping with American consti-
tutional and political realities. The Conclusion ultimately rec-
ommends that, of these options, the best approach to the exercise
of "doing-business" jurisdiction over foreign defendants would be
the adoption of a modified Hague proposal or a return by the Su-
preme Court to a purer standard for general "doing-business" ju-
risdiction in which such jurisdiction is permitted only if the state
would be justified in deciding a claim that is wholly unrelated to
the defendant's forum contacts.
I. THE BAFFLING RATIONALE FOR DISPUTE-BLIND JURISDICTION
Both the theory and practice of doing-business jurisdiction
are problematic. Courts seem to have articulated a fairly
5 See id at Art 6 (exceptions for suits regarding contracts); Art 7 (exceptions for suits
regarding consumer contracts); Art 8 (exceptions for suits regarding individual employ-
ment contracts); Art 9 (exceptions for suits regarding defendant's branch office if such
office is related to the suit); Art 10 (stating that suit may be maintained where tortious
activity took place); Art 11 (stating that a suit regarding a trust may be maintained where
trust is administered or in forum most closely related to the trust); Art 12 (exceptions for
suits regarding specific property); Art 14 (exceptions for multiple defendants); Art 15
(exceptions for counterclaims); Art 16 (exceptions for third party claims).
6 Id at Art 18(2)(e).
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straightforward standard for doing-business jurisdiction: states
have general jurisdiction over corporations doing continuous and
systematic business in the forum.7 But beneath this formula lies
a series of hard questions. As Professor Juenger has pointed out,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries our courts
struggled to determine the theoretical basis for this form of juris-
diction, working uneasily with concepts of presence, consent, and
implied consent.' Ironically, despite their attempts to ground gen-
eral jurisdiction in principles of private international law, the
rule that American courts developed for doing-business jurisdic-
tion is regarded as exorbitant by almost all members of the inter-
national community.' This lack of a firm theoretical underpin-
ning, coupled with the practical problems courts encounter in ap-
plying the doctrine today,' ° makes its practice today more the
product of circumstance and compromise than of a principled ap-
plication of a well-developed theory.
A. Scholars and the Search for a Theory of General Jurisdiction
The principle of doing-business jurisdiction seems simple on
the surface: the defendant business has such strong ties with the
state that it may be sued there on any cause of action." What is
particularly troubling about the doctrine is the notion that a fo-
rum can hear any claim asserted against a defendant having
regular and consistent commercial activities in the forum, no
matter how removed the facts of the claim are from those activi-
ties. Why do we give a forum this power?
7 See Perkins v Benguet Consolidated Mining Co, 342 US 437, 438, 447-48 (1952)
(finding general jurisdiction where defendant corporation's forum activities were "continu-
ous and systematic, but limited"). See also Sarah R. Cebik, "A Riddle Wrapped in a Mys-
tery Inside an Enigma": General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998
Ann Surv Am L 1, 7 (noting that the Supreme Court uses the "continuous and systematic"
test for general jurisdiction). But see text accompanying notes 44-48 and 57-60 (arguing
that the Court does not intend that "continuous and systematic" contacts be sufficient in
all cases).
8 See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction,
2001 U Chi Legal F 141, 145-53 (describing theoretical development of general jurisdic-
tion in early cases).
9 See id at 146-49, 159, 161-63. England and Japan, to some extent, are limited
exceptions. See note 99.
10 See Part II A.
11 See International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 318 (1945) (noting that in
some prior cases, the defendant's "continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities"). See also Arthur T. von Me-
hren and Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv
L Rev 1121, 1148-53 (1966) (introducing the "general" and "specific" terminology).
171]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
1. Lea Brilmayer's "insider" approach.
Several commentators have attempted to identify the theo-
retical underpinnings of the doing-business doctrine. 2 Lea Bril-
mayer has proposed one of the most useful and widely-regarded
rationales for a state's power to exercise general jurisdiction over
a defendant doing business in a state. General jurisdiction is
available at the defendant's home base or where he engages in
systematic activity, she explains, because such "[slystematic un-
related activity, such as domicile, incorporation, or doing busi-
ness, suggests that the person or corporate entity is enough of an
'insider' that he may safely be relegated to the State's political
processes." 3 A defendant engaging in substantial commercial ac-
tivities within a forum should be held just as broadly accountable
in the state's courts as would a local business. 4 Convenience con-
siderations also support this broad jurisdiction, she argues, for
the very same reasons that courts permit it at the defendant's
home base:
To the extent that defending in one's domicile is conven-
ient, litigating where one carries on continuous and sys-
tematic activities is also likely to be convenient. Similarly,
allowing suit where the defendant is so engaged serves the
plaintiff's convenience by providing a more definite forum;
indeed, a test that focuses on continuous and systematic
activities eliminates the uncertainty of proving which of
several places is the defendant's principal place of busi-
ness. Most importantly, the reciprocal benefits rationale
obtains when the defendant carries out substantial activi-
ties, which implicate the police powers and public facilities
of the state.5
12 See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 S Ct Rev 77; Lea Brilmayer, et al, A General Look at General Jurisdic-
tion, 66 Tex L Rev 723 (1988); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federal-
ism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex L Rev 689 (1987); Cebik, 1998 Ann Surv
Am L at 7 (cited in note 7).
13 Brilmayer, 1980 S Ct Rev at 87 (cited in note 12). For a more detailed development
of Professor Brilmayer's general jurisdiction theory, see Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev 723
(1988) (cited in note 12).
14 See Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev at 742 (cited in note 12). See also Cebik, 1998
Ann Surv Am L at 26-31 (cited in note 7) (discussing Brilmayer's test in depth and sug-
gesting an alternative approach).
15 Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev at 741 (emphasis added) (cited in note 12).
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The "reciprocal benefits" rationale is what interests me here,
since it attempts to explain (without quite succeeding) why
"doing-business" jurisdiction is so broad-why it gives the forum
power to decide any claim arising from defendant's activities
anywhere in the world.
A quid-pro-quo justification works well for specific jurisdic-
tion. The scope of the defendant's activity defines the scope of the
risk. As the Supreme Court noted in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp v Woodson:'6
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor
such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated oc-
currence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer
or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market
for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to
subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly de-
fective merchandise has there been the source of injury to
its owner or to others.17
This is a logically appealing result: a defendant that actively
markets its products in other states should expect to be subjected
to suits there arising from injuries caused by its defective prod-
ucts."s While the burden of defending a particular suit in the state
may be greater than the benefits derived from the particular
state-related activity, 9 the scope of the risk of being subject to
jurisdiction in the state is proportionate to the scope of the defen-
dant's forum-related activities.
There is, however, no equivalent proportionality for an
activities-based general jurisdiction. Regular and continuous ac-
tivity in the forum may benefit the defendant in many regards,
but this alone does not justify the burden of unlimited jurisdic-
18 444 US 286 (1980).
17 Id at 297.
18 See International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 319 (1945):
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws
of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations,
and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the ac-
tivities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly
be said to be undue.
19 See Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 736 (cited in note 12) (noting that the burdens of possi-
ble jurisdiction often far outweigh the benefits conferred by the forum state).
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tional exposure in that forum.2" Calling such a defendant an "in-
sider" may point us in the right direction, but a look at the cur-
rent case law shows us that greater clarification is necessary.
Our courts have exercised general jurisdiction over defen-
dants with no physical presence in the forum-whose only con-
tacts are purchases from forum sellers,2 sales to forum customers
through third parties,2 2 or even purchases by web site or mail or-
der23-sometimes using this same reciprocal benefits rationale.24
By relying solely on a finding of "continuous and systematic con-
tacts" and the reciprocal benefits justification, without further
exploring the question of whether this defendant should be re-
garded as an "insider," courts are applying a theory that makes
perfect sense in the context of specific jurisdiction and extending
it to general jurisdiction without carefully examining the wisdom
of that extension. Such courts have, in effect, modified the World-
Wide Volkswagen proposition so that it reads:
[Ihf the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor
such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated oc-
currence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer
or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for
its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to sub-
ject it to any suit whatsoever in one of those States ....25
20 But compare Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev at 732-33 (cited in note 12) (elaborat-
ing on the reciprocal benefits and burdens rationale as the strongest basis for the state's
exercise of coercive power over a domiciliary defendant).
21 See, for example, Pearl Brewing Co v Trans-USA Corp, 1997 WL 340940, *3 (N D
Tex 1997) (finding general jurisdiction over a distributor that bought products of a forum
manufacturer).
22 See Michigan National Bank v Quality Dinette, Inc, 888 F2d 462, 465-66 (6th Cir
1989) (finding general jurisdiction over a defendant making sales in the forum through an
independent sales representative).
23 See, for example, American Type Culture Collection, Inc v Coleman, 26 SW3d 37,
39-40, 52 (Tex App 2000) (finding general jurisdiction over a defendant whose only con-
tact with the forum was through mail order sales).
24 See, for example, Wise v Lindamood, 89 F Supp 2d 1187, 1193 (D Colo 1999) (ar-
ticulating a finding of general jurisdiction in terms of reciprocity, holding that "because
[defendant] enjoyed the benefits and protections of Colorado's laws, it must now submit to
the burdens of litigation in Colorado"); Publications International, Ltd v Burke/Triolo,
Inc, 121 F Supp 2d 1178, 1183 (N D Ill 2000) (finding that sales made over defendant's
web site established general as well as specific jurisdiction, and using "benefits and bur-
den" language).
25 Modifying World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 297. See text accompanying note 17.
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2. The "adoptive home" and "core policy/activities" approaches.
While agreeing with Professor Brilmayer that the theoretical
basis for general jurisdiction over corporations rests squarely on
the question of the proper allocation of sovereign authority
among the states, two other commentators have found different
ways to frame the standard.2 ' Allan Stein argues that: "The task
of defending the reach of a state's authority for jurisdictional
purposes is similar to the task of defining a state's appropriate
'interests' in modern conflict-of-laws doctrine."27 In Professor
Stein's view, the standard for doing-business jurisdiction should
be whether the defendant has "adopted" the state as its sover-
eign.28 Arguing for a "pervasive and systematic" contacts re-
quirement, he suggests that courts should determine "whether
the defendant has adopted the forum as its sovereign. Has it, for
most other purposes, treated the forum as its home, notwith-
standing its domicile elsewhere?" 29 It is not clear what a court
should look for in making the determination that a corporation
"treats the forum as its home" for "most purposes," but the stan-
dard may be higher than that applied using Professor Brilmayer's
"insider" test.
Sarah Cebik has posited a more specific and limited test for
general jurisdiction based on a "realist" theory of sovereign au-
thority. ° She proposes that the foundational question be framed
26 See Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 722 (cited in note 12) (noting that "the validity of a
state's assertion of jurisdiction is tested expressly by whether the state is acting within
the sphere of sovereign prerogative allocated to it within the federal system"); Cebik, 1998
Ann Surv Am L at 23-25 (cited in note 7) (suggesting that the minimum contacts test be
recharacterized as an inquiry into whether a defendant's activity within a state is such
that the state "has an interest in the defendant regardless of the particular controversy
underlying the cause of action").
27 Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 741 (cited in note 12).
28 According to Professor Stein:
A similar analysis applies to assertions of "general jurisdiction" over non-
citizens who have pervasive and systematic contacts with the forum and
therefore legitimately can be treated as constructive state citizens. At the
risk of resurrecting the social contract theory of personal jurisdiction, the
state's relationship with its residents does not appear significantly differ-
ent from its relationship with its citizens. The fairness of a state's juris-
diction over its citizens is based on a perceived equitable exchange of the
privileges of citizenship for its burdens. Accordingly, it is appropriate to
permit jurisdiction over persons who have structured a citizen-like rela-
tionship with the forum to the same extent that jurisdiction over absent
citizens would be sustained.
Id at 758 (citation omitted).
29 Id.
30 See generally Cebik, 1998 Ann Surv Am L 1 (cited in note 7).
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as what sort of "interest" the state has in the defendant which
would be recognized by other states if all states were to negotiate
for a uniform standard for general jurisdiction:
If [a state] claims to have an interest in the defendant (or,
in the case of specific jurisdiction, in the relation of the de-
fendant's forum activities to the cause of action), that in-
terest must be somehow related to this function as the de-
terminer of rights and duties. Thus, an "interest" in the
defendant [sufficient for general jurisdiction] is legitimate
if the state would have a reason to be concerned about the
rights and duties of the defendant under any circum-
stances .... The point at which a state will be concerned
with the rights and duties of a defendant under any and
all circumstances is not immediately obvious .... [Ilt is
largely a matter of practice and custom. 1
She concludes that three conditions would create a sufficient
interest in a state to support general jurisdiction: if the defendant
is incorporated under the state's law, if the defendant shapes its
corporate policy within the state, or if the defendant conducts its
core activities in the state.2 In all other cases, she argues, activi-
ties-based jurisdiction would be inappropriate.3
These attempts to identify the constitutional basis for doing-
business jurisdiction make one point clear: it is difficult to dis-
cover a rationale that will make it easy to draw a reasonably
clear line between forum-related commercial activities that
should support jurisdiction for any and all purposes and those
activities which should not. Indeed, the greater the focus on the
state's interest in the defendant as the source of its power to de-
cide any and all claims, the harder it is to decide which set of
forum-related actions creates the appropriate interest. When does
a defendant "adopt" a state: when it works in a local office in the
state, when it locates a store close to the state's border, when it
sells products or provides services to forum residents, or when it
buys products from forum residents from a distant location? What
if it conducts one of these activities-or any other forum-related
commercial activity-through a third party with ties to the state?
General concepts of the state's interest tell us little about
why a line might be drawn in one place and not another. We
31 Id at 33 (emphasis added).
32 Id at 36.
33 Id at 40.
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know only that some guidance is required, and it would be helpful
if it came at a theoretical level, without regard to the nature of
the claim, since the very point of general jurisdiction is that the
state's authority derives from the defendant's relationship with
the state and not from the nature of the claim to be decided.
B. The Impact of Supreme Court Cases on Theory
1; Burnham and the benefits/burden rationale.
As important as it is to develop a solid theoretical foundation
for doing-business jurisdiction, given the Court's marked failure
to develop a coherent theory of personal jurisdiction,34 it is
unlikely that we will soon agree on a core approach. If there was
ever any hope of arriving at a clearly articulated theory for gen-
eral jurisdiction, the decision in Burnham v Superior Court of
California35 probably signaled an end to that hope.
In Burnham, the Court unanimously upheld general jurisdic-
tion over a defendant served while traveling in the forum. The
Court's split decisions offered no rationale sufficiently robust to
provide a meaningful explanation of the state's authority to de-
cide any and all claims asserted against an individual defendant
who is served with process within the forum.
Four of the Justices based their decision solely on the histori-
cal pedigree of service jurisdiction, making no attempt to explain
the theoretical basis for this power.36 The remaining four Justices
appropriately challenged this rationale as untenable in the face of
Shaffer v Heitner,37 which required that "all assertions of state
court jurisdiction" be evaluated under the standards set forth in
34 Despite strong and persuasive scholarship, the Court has not developed a clear
theoretical basis for personal jurisdiction. See generally Stein, 65 Tex L Rev 689 (cited in
note 12) (arguing that any theory of personal jurisdiction must be based on the allocation
of power among the states); Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers"for International Shoe (And
None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 UC Davis
L Rev 755 (1995) (criticizing the addition of a separate "reasonableness" prong to the per-
sonal jurisdiction test); Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdic-
tion for the Twenty-First Century, 66 U Cin L Rev 385 (1998) (stating that the Court's
emphasis on foreseeability of suit renders personal jurisdiction doctrine "fundamentally
incoherent"); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the
Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 Jurimet J 575, 577-78, 606-10
(1998) (noting that the "purposeful availment" standard is unworkable and proposing a
test that looks at only two factors: a threshold requirement of state interest and avoidance
of significant procedural burdens and inconveniences for the defendant).
35 495 US 604 (1990)
36 Id at 610-19 (Scalia plurality).
37 433 US 186 (1977).
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International Shoe Co v Washington38 and its progeny,39 but then
proceeded to offer an even more outrageous fairness justification:
anyone traveling into the forum has benefited from the state's
highways and police powers and could use the state courts if he
so chose. Therefore, it is fair to subject him to jurisdiction there
on any transitory cause of action, as long as he is served within
the state.4" One must agree with Justice Scalia, who scoffingly
questioned what sort of quid pro quo this was:
Three days' worth of these benefits strike us as powerfully
inadequate to establish, as an abstract matter, that it is
"fair" for California to decree the ownership of all Mr.
Burnham's worldly goods acquired during the 10 years of
his marriage, and the custody over his children. We dare-
say a contractual exchange swapping those benefits for
that power would not survive the "unconscionability" pro-
vision of the Uniform Commercial Code.41
After Burnham, we are left with no theory for understanding
general jurisdiction and with little prospect that the Court will
put meaningful limits on doing-business jurisdiction in the future
since it easily satisfies both Burnham rationales. It is indeed a
venerable form of American jurisdiction, challenged by the acad-
38 326 US 310 (1945).
39 See Burnham, 495 US at 629-33 (Brennan concurring) (discussing Shaffer, Inter-
national Shoe and subsequent cases).
40 Id (citations omitted):
By visiting the forum State, a transient defendant actually 'avail[s]' him-
self ... of significant benefits provided by the State. His health and
safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emergency medical
services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and waterways; he likely
enjoys the fruits of the State's economy as well. Moreover, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV prevents a state government from
discriminating against a transient defendant by denying him the protec-
tions of its law or the right of access to its courts.... Subject only to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, an out-of-state plaintiff may use state
courts in all circumstances in which those courts would be available to
state citizens. Without transient jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise:
A transient would have the full benefit-of the power of the forum State's
courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity from their authority as a
defendant.
See also Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22
Rutgers L J 659, 661-62 (1991) (criticizing Brennan's rationale).
41 Burnham, 495 US at 623. The "benefits" questioned by Justice Scalia included "the
fact that... [hlis health and safety [were] guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emer-
gency medical services; he [was] free to travel on the State's roads and waterways; [and
that] he likely enjoy[ed] the fruits of the State's economy." Id.
DOING-BUSINESS JURISDICTION
emy less often than tag jurisdiction.42 Furthermore, the benefits
received by a defendant with continuous commercial activities
within a state certainly exceed the thin potential benefits re-
ceived by the hapless traveler who barely sets foot in the forum's
territory. For better or for worse, it is unlikely that we can find
any help for general jurisdiction at the theoretical level.
2. Designing a theory: the confounding problem of scope.
This lack of sound general jurisdiction theory affects doing-
business decisionmaking in a very particular way. Since general
jurisdiction rests wholly on the special relationship between the
defendant and the state, the nature of the cause of action is im-
material for determining its presence or absence. Jurisdiction for
any and all purposes necessarily means jurisdiction over any and
all causes of action.
Theorists are asking what it is about the nature of the defen-
dant's ties to the state that will justify its assertion of a state's
plenary judicial authority. Courts deciding actual cases, however,
do not make general jurisdiction decisions in a vacuum. Instead,
they are confronted by a particular case that often bears some
connection to the defendant's forum contacts. Without better
guidance concerning the basis for doing-business jurisdiction or
the means to make distinctions between strong and weak cases, it
is not surprising that judges may be influenced by the nature of
the claim actually presented. The following sections will examine
the approach of courts in making doing-business decisions, with
particular attention to this difficult problem of scope.
42 See, for example, Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev at 735-48, 754-55 (cited in note
12) (accepting doing-business general jurisdiction while arguing that "transient jurisdic-
tion has outlived its theoretical justifications"); Patrick J. Borchers, Competing Personal
Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons for American
Reform, 40 Am J Comp L 121, 134-35 (1992) (noting that general jurisdiction based on
continuous and systematic activities is more reasonable than general jurisdiction based on
in-state service of process); Allan R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 22 Rutgers L J 597, 608 (1991) (asserting that where there is no
connection between forum and litigation, using personal service as the basis for jurisdic-
tion is "offensive," and implicitly endorsing the need for continuous and systematic con-
tacts).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH APPLICATION
A. The Malleable Standard: It All Depends on the
Meaning of "So"
Just as troubling as its uncertain rationale is the weak "con-
tinuous and systematic" standard that lower courts frequently
apply when deciding whether doing-business jurisdiction exists.
The phrase "continuous and systematic" appears in Supreme
Court jurisdiction cases, and lower courts often use this standard
as the sole touchstone for this form of jurisdiction.43 Yet our Su-
preme Court precedents, however meager, indicate that finding
"continuous and systematic" contacts should only be the starting
point of the doing-business inquiry.
1. Source of the "continuous and systematic" standard: the
Supreme Court cases.
a) International Shoe's language: "so substantial and of
such a nature." While the phrase "continuous and systematic"
appears in International Shoe," it is important to recognize that
it appears only when the court is describing cases in which spe-
cific jurisdiction is clearly justified:
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been
doubted when the activities of the corporation there have
not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise
to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be
sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of proc-
ess has been given.45
The Court lists both "continuous and systematic" contacts
and a related cause of action as relevant to its finding that juris-
diction over the International Shoe Company is fair on these
facts:
43 See, for example, Arena Football League, Inc v Roemer, 947 F Supp 337, 340 (N D
Ill 1996) (citations omitted) ("It is proper to exercise general jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant that maintained 'continuous and systematic general business contacts'
in Illinois."); Best Buy Co, Inc v Smith & Alster, Inc, 1998 Minn App Lexis 1424, *5 (cita-
tion omitted) ("General jurisdiction, by contrast, arises where the defendant's contacts
with the forum state are 'continuous and systematic."').
44 326 US at 310.
45 Id at 317 (emphasis added).
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Applying these standards, the activities carried on in be-
half of appellant in the State of Washington were neither
irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous
throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large
volume of interstate business, in the course of which ap-
pellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of
the state .... The obligation which is here sued upon arose
out of those very activities. It is evident that these opera-
. tions establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of
the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice,
to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appel-
lant has incurred there.46
However, the Court introduces a higher, open-ended stan-
dard when describing the situations in which dispute-blind juris-
diction has been found in the past:
While it has been held in cases on which appellant relies,
that continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not
enough to support the demand that the corporation be
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity... there have
been instances in which the continuous corporate opera-
tions within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of ac-
tion arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.47
The standard, then, is "continuous" operations within the state
that are "so substantial and of such a nature" to justify dispute-
blind jurisdiction. The Court offers no further gloss on this vague
and open-ended description, but the cases it cites for this point
involve defendants who were operating an office within the fo-
rum, staffed with their own employees.48
46 Id at 320 (emphasis added).
47 Id at 318 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
48 The International Shoe Court cited Missouri, Kan & Tex Railway Co v Reynolds,
255 US 565 (1921) and Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co, 220 NY 259 (1917). International
Shoe, 326 US at 318. In Reynolds, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a
lower court decision exercising jurisdiction over a corporation with a passenger agent
headquartered within the forum. Reynolds v Missouri, Kan & Tex Railway Co, 117 NE
913, 914 (1917). In Tauza, the New York Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction over a
corporation headquartered outside of the forum that operated a branch office in New York
with at least nine employees working out of the office. Tauza, 220 NY at 265, 268. The
Second Circuit's decision in Hutchinson v Chase & Gilbert, Inc, 45 F2d 139, 141 (2d Cir
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While International Shoe does not tell us more about what is
necessary for this dispute-blind jurisdiction, the Court is clearly
not saying that dispute-blind jurisdiction exists whenever "con-
tinuous and systematic" contacts are found. Indeed, it is difficult
to imagine that the Court would have permitted jurisdiction over
the International Shoe Company in Washington if the claim had
concerned, say, a contract dispute between the defendant corpo-
ration and one of its Missouri sales representatives. The corpora-
tion's "systematic and continuous" contacts made the specific ju-
risdiction question easy, but the Court's language here clearly
indicates that something more substantial is necessary for a
state's authority to extend to any and all claims against a defen-
dant.
The question after International Shoe should be not whether
continuous and substantial contacts exist, but whether they are
the type of contacts necessary to justify full-scale general jurisdic-
tion. And the question today might be: what level of activity
within a state must a business conduct before we may treat the
place of that business like a headquarters or a place of incorpora-
tion? Is an office still enough? Why? And what alternative con-
figurations should be enough?
b) Perkins, Helicopteros Nacionales, and Keeton: not all
contacts count the same. The Supreme Court's subsequent general
jurisdiction decisions, Perkins v Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co49 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v Hall, ° do
very little to answer these difficult questions. Neither do they
support a bare "continuous and systematic" standard. Although
both cases use this phrase, each indicates that something more is
required. In Perkins, the defendant was basically headquartered
1930), was also cited by the International Shoe Court in its discussion. 326 US at 317. In
Hutchinson, Judge Learned Hand expressed some uncertainty about the presence of an
office as a basis for jurisdiction:
Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of busi-
ness will serve without more.... In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., [ I
there was no more, but the business was continuous and substantial.
Purchases, though carried on regularly, are not enough ... nor are the
activities of subsidiary corporations ... or of connecting carriers .... The
maintenance of an office, though always a make-weight, and enough,
when accompanied by continuous negotiation, to settle claims ... is not of
much significance .... It is quite impossible to establish any rule from
the decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass.
45 F2d at 141-42 (citations omitted).
49 342 US 437 (1952).
50 466 US 408 (1984).
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in Ohio, if only temporarily, so this was not a situation in which
the defendant was merely "doing business" in the state."' In Heli-
copteros Nacionales, the totality of the defendant's contacts with
Texas might be characterized as "continuous and systematic,"52
yet the Court held that these were not the type of contacts suffi-
cient to support general jurisdiction. 3 Perhaps the Court's deci-
sion in Helicopteros Nacionales to discount purchases 4 was influ-
enced by the plea of the Solicitor General that the Court not allow
Texas to base general jurisdiction on purchases in the state for
fear of damaging export markets,55 a fact further supporting the
argument that it is the nature of a defendant's continuous and
systematic commercial contacts and not their existence that de-
termines whether dispute-blind jurisdiction is both wise and fair.
Unfortunately, neither opinion provides further help in determin-
ing exactly what that nature might be-except that purchases are
not sufficient.56
Dicta in Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc57 further supports
the argument that general jurisdiction requires a very substan-
tial contact with the forum. The defendant, Hustler Magazine,
Inc., an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in
California, sold ten thousand to fifteen thousand copies of Hustler
51 See Perkins, 342 US at 447-48. During World War II, the company president main-
tained an office in the forum, from which he transacted company business. There, he drew
salary checks for himself and two employees, maintained and dispatched company funds,
oversaw company policies, and attended directors' meetings. See id.
52 Over a period of seven years, defendant company sent its chief executive officer to
Houston for contract negotiation, received checks drawn on a Houston bank, purchased
helicopters, equipment, and training services from a Texas supplier for substantial sums,
and sent personnel to Texas for training. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 US at 410-11.
53 The Court stated:
The Texas Supreme Court focused on the purchases and the related train-
ing trips in finding contacts sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdic-
tion. We do not agree with that assessment, for the Court's opinion in
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.... makes clear that pur-
chases and related trips, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a
State's assertion of jurisdiction.
Id at 417.
54 See id.
55 Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in
International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28
Tex Intl L J 501, 507 (1993) (pointing out that the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief
urging the Supreme Court to overturn the Texas decision, arguing that basing general
jurisdiction on purchases would hurt U.S. foreign markets).
56 But see Harley-Davidson Motor Co v Motor Sport, Inc, 960 F Supp 1386, 1389 (E D
Wis 1997) (finding defendant's large purchases from a forum manufacturer over a period
of twenty years sufficient to support general jurisdiction).
57 465 US 770 (1984).
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magazine in the forum each month." There is no doubt that this
level of activity, like the activity in International Shoe, would
qualify as "continuous and systematic." Yet in dicta the Court
indicated that these contacts might not justify general jurisdic-
tion over an unrelated cause of action:
In the instant case, respondent's activities in the forum
may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a
cause of action unrelated to those activities. But respon-
dent is carrying on a "part of its general business" in New
Hampshire, and that is sufficient to support jurisdiction
when the cause of action arises out of the very activity be-
ing conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.59
In the related footnote, the Court added:
The defendant corporation's contacts with the forum State
in Perkins were more substantial than those of respondent
with New Hampshire in this case. In Perkins, the corpora-
tion's mining operations, located in the Philippine Islands,
were completely halted during the Japanese occupation.
The president, who was also general manager and princi-
pal stockholder of the company, returned to his home in
Ohio where he carried on "a continuous and systematic
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of
the company." The company's files were kept in Ohio, sev-
eral directors' meetings were held there, substantial ac-
counts were maintained in Ohio banks, and all key busi-
ness decisions were made in the State. In those circum-
stances, Ohio was the corporation's principal, if temporary,
place of business so that Ohio jurisdiction was proper even
over a cause of action unrelated to the activities in the
State.80
Thus Keeton suggests, in keeping with the scant hints in other
Supreme Court cases, that something greater than continuous
and systematic contacts is required for doing-business jurisdic-
tion-perhaps a place of business, or even a principal place of
business.
58 Id at 772.
59 Id at 779-80.
60 Id at 780 n 11 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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2. The doing-business standard in the lower courts: how
substantial? And what nature?
Although courts frequently use the "continuous and system-
atic" language to describe the standard for doing-business juris-
diction,61 many lower courts, recognizing that something more
than continuous and systematic contacts are needed, have re-
quired that "substantial" contacts be found.2 However, these
cases rarely attempt to develop the content of this "substantial-
ity" requirement. 3 Indeed, most simply find that there are a lot of
"continuous and systematic" contacts; therefore they are "sub-
stantial." And, consequently, general jurisdiction exists.64
a) "Insiderness" rarely sought. It would be intriguing to
see courts work with the notion of "insiderness," and what that
might entail, but they have typically avoided this inquiry.65 For
61 See note 43. See also Marshall v Inn on Madeline Island, 610 NW2d 670, 676-77
(Minn App 2000) (finding that the Inn's contacts supported general jurisdiction under the
"continuous and systematic" standard); McDermott v Cronin, 31 SW3d 617, 621 (Tex App
2000) (holding general jurisdiction is established when defendant's contacts are continu-
ous and systematic).
62 See, for example, Anglo American Insurance Group v Calfed, Inc, 899 F Supp 1070,
1074 (S D NY 1995) ("Asserting jurisdiction over [the company] comports with the re-
quirement of due process because [the company's] contacts with New York are substan-
tial."). Sometimes courts use "substantiality" language because their long-arm statutes
require "substantial and not isolated" contacts. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 48.193(2)
(West 1994) ("A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within
this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activ-
ity."). However, this statutory language causes its own set of problems since it seems to
suggest that all contacts necessarily fall into one category or the other, leaving out the
entire mid-range: contacts that could not be characterized as "isolated" because there is
some continuity, yet which would not be sufficiently "substantial" to justify the exercise of
general jurisdiction.
63 The few cases that address the substantiality question in any depth generally do so
within the context of deciding whether general jurisdiction exists based on the acts of an
agent in the forum. Courts ask whether the agent's activities were sufficiently related to
the defendant's activities to be considered a "substantial" part of the business. See, for
example, Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 226 F3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir 2000) (basing
general jurisdiction on services performed by an agent in the forum); Gelfand v Tanner
Motor Tours, Ltd, 385 F2d 116, 120-21 (2d Cir 1967) (finding that defendant's agreement
with an in-forum travel agent was directly related to defendant's corporate purpose and
therefore supported doing-business jurisdiction).
64 See, for example, Harley-Davidson Motor Co v Motor Sport, Inc, 960 F Supp 1386,
1389 (E D Wis 1997), citing Capitol Indemnity Corp v Certain Lloyds Underwriters, 487 F
Supp 1115, 1117 (W D Wis 1980) (stating that a defendant is engaged in substantial ac-
tivities within the state when such activities are "systematic and continuous").
65 See Cebik, 1998 Ann Surv Am L at 31 (cited in note 7) (endorsing Brilmayer's sug-
gestion that courts might examine "insiderness" by asking whether the defendant had
been in a position to participate somehow in the forum's political processes).
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example, courts and commentators have argued that the percent-
age of a company's business in the forum should be irrelevant to
such a test-the relevant question is whether the company is act-
ing like a local business, not how much business it is doing in the
state.6 Yet many courts, struggling to decide whether a defen-
dant with some continuous forum-related activity is doing
"enough" for general jurisdiction, regularly consider such num-
bers because they lack any better guide. 7 Lobbying activities
within the forum should also be of some significance, since that is
one way that a corporate insider can influence local lawmaking, 8
and yet at least one court has ruled that it will not consider lob-
bying activity in determining whether doing-business jurisdiction
exists. 9
b) Agency issues: reaching a defendant through its in-
state agents. The question of counting contacts is further compli-
cated by the variety of ways in which commercial entities do
business in a state. We have moved a long way from the local of-
fice, staffed by local employees, as the major basis for finding do-
ing-business jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Nonresidents
conduct modern commerce through a multitude of arrangements
with subsidiaries,7" agents,7 independent contractors,72 and even
66 See Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev at 742 (cited in note 12). See also Provident
National Bank v Cal Federal Savings & Loan Association, 819 F2d 434, 437-38 (3d Cir
1987) (holding that the size of the percentage of defendant's total business represented by
its forum contacts is generally irrelevant).
67 See, for example, Wenche Siemer v Learjet Acquisition Corp, 966 F2d 179, 181 (5th
Cir 1992) (finding it significant that only slightly over one percent of defendant's sales
went to buyers with forum addresses); Northwestern Corp v Gabriel Manufacturing Co,
Inc, 1996 WL 73622, *2 (N D Ill) (considering percentage of business important to the
question of whether to assert general jurisdiction).
68 See Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev at 742 (cited in note 12).
69 Hollar v Philip Morris Inc, 43 F Supp 2d 794, 801-02 n 6 (N D Ohio 1998) (holding
that the "government contacts" doctrine prevents it from considering defendant's exten-
sive lobbying activities within state in deciding personal jurisdiction). This application of
the government contacts doctrine to an attempt to lobby state government is curious since
the "government contacts" exception was developed to protect those lobbying the federal
government. See Hilaire Henthorne Butler, Note, The Government Contacts Exception to
the District of Columbia Long-Arm Statute: Portrait of a Legal Morass, 36 Cath U L Rev
745, 745 (1987) (noting the exception's purpose of precluding the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction by the District of Columbia over nonresidents "if the nonresident's only contact
in the District of Columbia is through Congress or a federal agency"). At the very least
courts or legislatures should decide whether such state lobbying activity should count as a
contact in the jurisdictional calculus.
70 See IDS Life Insurance Co v Sunamerica, Inc, 958 F Supp 1258, 1266-67 (N D Ill
1997) (holding that foreign defendant had insufficient control over a local subsidiary to
establish doing-businegs jurisdiction over the parent).
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their own parent corporations, using a variety of interstate and
international means of communication and contract performance.
A person can do enormous business in many states or nations
without ever leaving her own computer chair. Advanced technol-
ogy also facilitates more complex business relationships that do
not readily correspond with traditional models of doing business.
Faced with these commercial realities, many courts today
must determine what role these intermediate relationships and
novel forms of business should play in justifying both specific and
general jurisdiction. 4 When the issue is one of specific jurisdic-
tion, the task is quite straightforward: in exercising its authority
to regulate forum activity, the court must decide whether it can
reach beyond its borders to a distant defendant based on that de-
fendant's connection to that forum-related activity. When the
question is one of general jurisdiction, the court faces a more
complex question: can it subject a distant defendant to jurisdic-
tion in any and all cases by virtue of that defendant's connection
to the forum-related activities of other persons or legal entities?75
Given the complexities of these issues, it is little wonder that we
have failed to develop any sort of clear understanding of what it
takes to be "doing business" in a state sufficient for general juris-
diction, on either a theoretical or practical level.
71 See Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 226 F3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir 2000) (basing
general jurisdiction on services performed by an agent in the forum state).
72 See, for example, Ontel Products, Inc v Project Strategies Corp, 899 F Supp 1144,
1147 (S D NY 1995) (stating that defendant's relationship with an in-forum independent
contractor could be sufficient to establish general jurisdiction).
73 See, for example, Larball Publishing Co v CBS, Inc, 664 F Supp 704, 706-708 (S D
NY 1987) (finding that a forum-based parent acted as the agent for a foreign subsidiary).
See also Michael G. Albano, Note, Agency as a Means of Obtaining Jurisdiction in New
York Over Foreign Corporations: A Failed Theory, 20 Brooklyn J Intl L 169 (1993) (criticiz-
ing the agency basis for jurisdiction).
74 See text accompanying notes 49-60. This is not always a doing-business question;
sometimes it is a straightforward specific jurisdiction question in which the court is
merely deciding whether to pierce a corporate veil. See, for example, Snell v Bob Fisher
Enterprises, Inc, 106 F Supp 2d 87, 91-92 (D Me 2000) (refusing to attribute to
non-resident defendant corporation the forum contacts of sole proprietorship in order to
establish specific jurisdiction).
75 See, for example, Anglo American Insurance Group, PLC v Calfed, Inc, 899 F Supp
1070, 1073-74 (S D NY 1995) (finding that a New York federal district court could assert
personal jurisdiction over an English insurance company that collected millions of dollars
in premiums through New York excess line brokers, relied solely on the New York brokers
to acquire information about prospective policyholders, complied with extensive New York
regulations and guidelines for doing business there, filed annual financial statements with
New York, and maintained a sizeable trust fund in New York).
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B. The Influence of Related Claims: Justice Slips off
the Blindfold
A third force keeps doing-business jurisdiction both unsettled
and unsettling. Because general jurisdiction by definition applies
to all claims asserted against a defendant, courts frequently must
decide whether general jurisdiction exists when the claim is
somehow related to the defendant's forum activities.7" The rela-
tionship between claim and forum activities may greatly influ-
ence a court's jurisdictional decision, either implicitly 7 or explic-
itly, 78 although in theory it should not play any role in dispute-
blind jurisdiction analysis. In many of these cases, one wonders
whether the court would have found the particular contacts suffi-
ciently substantial had they been presented in a case that was
wholly unrelated to those activities.79
1. Most recent cases involve "related" claims.
In fact, most cases finding general jurisdiction will involve a
dispute that is at least tenuously related to the defendant's forum
contacts. Of the several hundred reported cases in which general
jurisdiction was asserted over a non-American defendant between
76 Professor Brilmayer states that courts should decide the relatedness question first,
see Brilmayer, et al, 66 Tex L Rev at 736 (cited in note 12) ("Given that general jurisdic-
tion requires a larger number of contacts, determining whether activities are related or
connected in the appropriate sense becomes crucial. Resolution of the relatedness issue
thus should precede an assessment of the contacts' quantity."). However, courts often do
not resolve this issue first, particularly when the general jurisdiction question is easier.
See note 83.
77 For example, in Wise v Lindamood, 89 F Supp 2d 1187, 1193 (D Colo 1999), the
court found "general personal jurisdiction" over both an employer and its employee in a
copyright infringement suit arising directly out of the defendant employer's forum con-
tacts. If the suit had been filed against the employee based on a wholly-unrelated cause of
action, it is unlikely that the court would have found those contacts sufficient for general
jurisdiction.
78 Sometimes courts consider the very case itself in deciding whether "general" juris-
diction exists. See, for example, Bruggeman v Meditrust Acquisition Co, 532 SE2d 215,
219 (NC App 2000) (justifying "personal general jurisdiction" in part because alleged ac-
tivities for which plaintiffs sought compensation occurred in state and plaintiff was a local
resident).
79 See, for example, Future Tech International, Inc v Tae II Media, Ltd, 944 F Supp
1538, 1558 (S D Fla 1996) (holding that forum had general jurisdiction over Korean manu-
facturer based on its business trips to the forum and business communications with indi-
viduals in the forum occurring over a period of about a year in a suit involving claims
directly related to these activities); Best Buy Co, Inc v Smith & Alster, Inc, 1998 Minn App
Lexis 1424, *5 (holding that forum had general jurisdiction over a company and its CEO,
who, over the course of one year, traveled to the forum twice and sent faxes relating to
forum business activities).
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January 1995 and September 2000,8" courts exercised such juris-
diction in fewer than twenty-five cases.8 In almost half of the
80 Researching general jurisdiction cases is difficult. There is no Westlaw key number
for general jurisdiction, which indicates both the good sense of the Westlaw employees and
the problem with this area. General jurisdiction and doing-business jurisdiction are men-
tioned in many cases--far more frequently mentioned than found to exist-and it is some-
times difficult to tell whether a court has actually based its decision on general jurisdic-
tion. See, for example, Wise v Lindamood, 89 F Supp 2d 1187, 1193 (D Colo 1999) (mixing
general and specific jurisdiction analysis). My research assistant came up with a total of
only sixteen reported cases in the last five and one-half years in which courts found gen-
eral jurisdiction to exist over either domestic or foreign defendants. Skeptical at these
results, we went back and tried again with different word searches, this time locating
another seventy or so. Thus, of a thousand or so reported opinions mentioning "general
jurisdiction" or "doing-business" jurisdiction or "general personal jurisdiction," fewer than
twenty opinions a year actually held that it existed. And of those twenty, only three or
four involved foreign defendants. Of course, these are only the reported cases, and pre-
sumably many defendants do not litigate the issue at all. See text accompanying note 88.
We also went back and looked for cases in the last year involving a foreign defendant and
a foreign cause of action in which defendants raised no general jurisdiction defense, but
presented either forum non conveniens or choice of law defenses. This research produced
only four more cases, which suggests that the number of cases may be fairly small in
which general jurisdiction is sought over a foreign defendant that elects to fight the loca-
tion of the case in U.S. courts or the application of U.S. law to the case.
81 My research uncovered twenty-one cases in which a court asserted personal juris-
diction over a non-American defendant, although some may have been overlooked. In one
case, the court based general jurisdiction on service upon an individual within the forum.
See Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 246-47 (2d Cir 1995) (asserting general jurisdiction
over defendant served while physically present in the forum). In the remaining twenty
cases, courts asserted jurisdiction over non-American defendants because they were doing
business within the forum. See Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 226 F3d 88, 95-96 (2d
Cir 2000) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant whose agent performed investor
relations services in the forum on behalf of defendant); Huangyan Import & Export Corp v
Nature's Farm Products, Inc, 2000 US Dist Lexis 12335, *14 (S D NY) (asserting general
jurisdiction over defendant with substantial banking activities in the forum); Shaheen
Sports, Inc v Asia Insurance Co, Ltd, 89 F Supp 2d 500, 503 (S D NY 2000) (asserting
general jurisdiction over defendant whose agent settled insurance claims in the forum on
behalf of defendant); Doe v Sun International Hotels, Ltd, 1999 US Dist Lexis 4186, *10-
12 (S D Fla) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant that maintained an office and
advertised in the forum and fourteen percent of defendant's clients were from forum); ESI,
Inc v Coastal Corp, 61 F Supp 2d 35, 56-57 (S D NY 1999) (asserting general jurisdiction
over defendant when defendant's affiliate, present and doing business in the forum, was
found to be a "mere department" of the defendant); City of El Paso v Soule, 991 F Supp
812, 818-19 (W D Tex 1998) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant that had signa-
tory authority for forum bank account, conducted personal banking in the forum, and
listed forum as permanent address); Sandstrom v Cultor Food Science, Inc, 1998 US Dist
Lexis 9034, *4-8 (N D Ill) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant doing business
within the forum through wholly-owned subsidiaries); United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v Sulli-
van, 1998 US Dist Lexis 13996, *14-15 (S D NY) (asserting general jurisdiction over de-
fendants that, among other things, sent and received correspondence from forum state,
listed forum addresses on stationary, maintained a telephone number within the forum,
and traveled to the forum for business meetings); First American Corp v Price Waterhouse
LLP, 988 F Supp 353, 361-63 (S D NY 1997) (asserting general jurisdiction over defen-
dant that "sent detailed instructions to and repeatedly communicated with" agent doing
business in the forum over a six-year period); WMW Machinery, Inc v Werkzeugmaschi-
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cases finding general jurisdiction based on the defendant's forum
business activities, the claim was directly related to those forum
contacts." In several additional cases the claim bore some rela-
tionship to the defendant's forum contacts, but the courts found
general jurisdiction and did not resolve the possibly more difficult
specific jurisdiction question.s3 In very few cases, the claim was
nenhandel GmbH IM Au/bau, 960 F Supp 734, 743-44 (S D NY 1997) (asserting general
jurisdiction over defendant that had done business in the forum, even though defendant
ceased at least two years before plaintiff filed suit); Future Tech International, Inc v Tae Il
Media, Ltd, 944 F Supp 1538, 1557-58 (S D Fla 1996) (asserting general jurisdiction over
defendants whose representatives traveled to the forum and communicated with forum
residents over the course of one year); Kim v Frank MohnA/S, 925 F Supp 491, 493-94 (S
D Tex 1996) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant that maintained contact with
forum through wholly-owned subsidiary located in forum); Summit Machine Tool Manu-
facturing Corp v Warren Transport, Inc, 920 F Supp 722, 726-27 (S D Tex 1996) (finding
sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction based on defendant's business activities with
several forum companies); United States v Nippon Paper Industries Co, Ltd, 944 F Supp
55, 62 (D Mass 1996) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant that maintained of-
fices in the U.S., owned portion of U.S. business, and traveled to U.S. to conduct business
and oversee operations); American Cyanamid Co v Eli Lilly and Co, 903 F Supp 781, 786-
87 (D NJ 1995) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant that maintained a presence
in the forum through a subsidiary and conducted collaborative research and development
activities within transferee forum); Anglo American Insurance Group, PLC v Calfed, Inc,
899 F Supp 1070, 1073-74 (S D NY 1995) (asserting general jurisdiction over defendant
that "continuously demonstrate[d] its desire to do business in [the forum] by, among other
things, purposefully filing annual financial statements" with the forum state government
and selling insurance policies through excess line insurers in forum); Georgia-Pacific Corp
v Multimark's International, Ltd, 706 NYS2d 82, 83-84 (App Div 2000) (asserting general
jurisdiction over defendant that merely maintained a bank account in forum); Daimler-
Benz Aktiengesellschaft v Olson, 21 SW3d 707, 717-26 (Tex App 2000) (asserting general
jurisdiction over defendant car manufacturer that advertised in the forum through its
trademarks, had a subsidiary present in the forum, and maintained an interactive web
site accessible from the forum); BMC Software Belgium, NV v Marchand, 2000 Tex App
Lexis 5507, *9-13 (asserting general jurisdiction over foreign subsidiary of forum parent
corporation); Puri v Mansukhani, 973 SW2d 701, 710-11 (Tex App 1998) (asserting gen-
eral jurisdiction over defendant because of contacts with forum residents and involvement
in management of forum business).
82 In nine cases, the court specifically found that both general and specific jurisdiction
existed: ESI, 61 F Supp 2d at 58; Andersen v Sportmart, Inc, 179 FRD 236, 242 (N D Ind
1998) (enough to meet burden of pleading); City of El Paso, 991 F Supp at 825; WMW
Machinery, 960 F Supp at 744; Future Tech International, 944 F Supp at 1558; Summit
Machine Tool, 920 F Supp at 726; American Cyanamid, 903 F Supp at 786; BMC Soft-
ware, 2000 Tex App Lexis 5507 at *12, 14; Puri, 973 SW2d at 714.
83 This was usually true when either the allegedly illegal acts or the injury occurred
outside the forum. See Shaheen Sports, 89 F Supp 2d at 501-03 (holding that where a
damaged shipment sent from abroad into the forum resulted in suit against shipper's
insurer, general jurisdiction existed based on insurer's agency relationship with a forum
business); Sun International, 1999 US Dist Lexis 4186 at *11-12 (finding general jurisdic-
tion when injury occurred in hotel outside forum, without examining the possible causal
connection between plaintiffs claim need not be causally connected to and defendant's
forum activities); Sandstrom, 1998 US Dist Lexis 9034 at *10 (in a breach of contract suit
by employee, the court held that by sending its employees to work on a long-term basis in
forum, defendant "established" an ongoing permanence and continuity of activity in fo-
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fairly distant from the defendant's forum contacts, 4 and in only
two cases was it totally unrelated." Because related-claim situa-
tions are so common, they may indeed play a significant role in
broadening the circumstances in which courts find doing-business
jurisdiction. Unless a method is developed preventing a court
from taking the nature of the claim into consideration in deciding
the general jurisdiction issue, this expansion will inevitably oc-
cur.
2. Lack of information: the unreported general
jurisdiction cases.
It is important to recognize that the published case law does
not reflect the entire picture. General jurisdiction cases often fly
below the radar, and it is difficult to know how frequently be-
cause such cases are not reported in the case law. 6 There are two
reasons for this. First, defendants are unlikely to object to gen-
eral jurisdiction in a forum if they operate directly from a physi-
cal office there, since this has always been held to be sufficient to
rum); Kim v Frank Mohn, 925 F Supp at 492-94 (finding personal jurisdiction where
injury occurred in forum but defendant's activities related to the product that caused the
injury occurred elsewhere); Anglo American Insurance Group, 899 F Supp at 1075 (holding
that once the court established general jurisdiction, it need not decide whether specific
jurisdiction existed in a case where it was unclear where the acts and injury occurred);
Daimler-Benz, 21 SW3d at 718 (finding general jurisdiction where injury occurred in fo-
rum, manufacturer sold and serviced cars in forum, but the car in question was sold in
Europe before being driven by a forum citizen). In the cases cited in this and the following
footnotes, courts may have been unable to find specific jurisdiction, or unwilling to make
the effort, because of the uncertainty about the type of "relatedness" needed for specific
jurisdiction. For the leading article in this area, see Brilmayer, 1980 S Ct Rev 77 (cited in
note 12). For a general discussion, see also Twitchell, 101 Harv L Rev 610 (cited in note 1).
84 See First American Corp, 988 F Supp 353 at 361-63 (finding personal jurisdiction
over United Kingdom accounting firm because it was using a forum partnership to per-
form auditing functions in forum unrelated to claim); Georgia-Pacific Corp, 706 NYS2d at
83-84 (finding general jurisdiction based on defendant's use of forum bank to conduct
almost all of its business; suit related in sense that plaintiff alleged defendant and co-
defendant conspired to have funds at issue illegally diverted from one forum bank account
to another account at same forum bank); Huangyan Import & Export Corp, 2000 US Dist
Lexis 12335 at *2-3, 14 (finding general jurisdiction because of defendant's central and
substantial business activities conducted with forum bank; suit related in sense that
plaintiff alleged that co-defendant forum bank controlled defendant and that co-
defendants conspired to withhold payments legally owed to plaintiff).
85 Wiwa, 226 F3d at 95-96 (activities of defendant's agent in forum); Kadic, 70 F3d at
246-47 (service of process in forum). Although these cases were the least related to defen-
dant's forum contacts, under the proposed Hague Convention, jurisdiction would be avail-
able over both because of the Proposal's human rights exception. Hague Draft Proposal at
Art 18(3) (cited in note 4).
86 See note 80.
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justify general jurisdiction.87 Second, because of the expense and
uncertainty of pursuing jurisdictional challenges, some defen-
dants may not object at all, or may pursue a forum non conven-
iens challenge instead.88 Small businesses often cannot afford the
fifteen thousand to fifty thousand dollars necessary to litigate the
personal jurisdiction issue through an appeal.89 This is ironic,
since large enterprises over whom general jurisdiction would
seem most appropriate are probably those most likely to litigate
the issue, while smaller companies, over whom the propriety of
general jurisdiction is more questionable, are less able to get the
issue resolved effectively because of the costs of mounting a de-
fense."
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A LOOSE APPROACH
Why do we persist in subjecting defendants to such a loose,
unpredictable, poorly defined, and poorly defended standard?
Several reasons are self-evident. First, it is a traditional practice
going back to very early cases. Second, as long as we use a weak
standard, the test is fairly easy to administer because courts need
only assess a single variable, the continuity and systematic na-
ture-and, less frequently, the substantiality-of the defendant's
contacts. Finally, given the variety of business activities that can
occur in a forum and our uncertainties about the constitutional
87 See note 48. But see Follette v Clairol, Inc, 829 F Supp 840, 846-48 (W D La 1993)
(defendant Wal-Mart successfully challenging jurisdiction on reasonableness grounds
despite its substantial and continuous physical operations within forum); Gerry Tanner &
Co v Kroger, Co, 1996 Tex App Lexis 404, *5, 9-15 (defendant Kroger challenging general
jurisdiction despite the fact that it had (rejecting challenge to general jurisdiction by de-
fendant that had fifty stores in the forum and had done business there since 1956).
88 See Letter from Michael Gordon, Professor at University of Florida College of Law,
to client (Oct 4, 2000) ("Gordon letter") [on file with U Chi Legal F] (in a suit filed against
foreign chemical manufacturer, recommending that for strategic and economic reasons the
defendant raise a forum non conveniens defense but not an available personal jurisdiction
defense).
89 Telephone interview with Andrew J. Markus, Former Chair, Comparative Law
Division, American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, and Special
Counsel, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Miami, Florida (Nov 5, 2000) ("Markus inter-
view") (estimating that it would have cost one of his clients in a simple case fifteen thou-
sand to fifty thousand dollars to fight for personal jurisdiction at his home).
90 But see Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 UC Davis L Rev
1027, 1043 (1995). Referring to the International Shoe case, Juenger wrote:
The primary targets of jurisdictional exorbitance, especially of our overly
broad notion of general jurisdiction, are usually large enterprises, such as
Volkswagen and Mitsubishi. Such multinationals tend to be less con-
cerned about recognition in their home states than they are about juris-
diction, which puts their United States assets in jeopardy.
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underpinnings of the doctrine, devising a more definitive stan-
dard is just too hard. Courts91 and legislatures92 discovered early
on that it is hard to define "doing business" with any precision.
The best they can do is to indicate that continuity and perhaps
substantiality are important-after that, things pretty much
come down to a question of degree. As Justice Learned Hand said
in 1930 as he struggled with this issue, "It is quite impossible to
establish any rule from the decided cases; we must step from tuft
to tuft across the morass."93
Finally, we use doing-business jurisdiction, as Professor
Borchers correctly argues, to fill in holes in our jurisdictional
scheme.94 By providing an additional forum for the plaintiff, we
may be engaging in some indirect economic equalization unat-
tainable through more straightforward means; occasionally, do-
91 See, for example, Hutchinson v Chase & Gilbert, Inc, 45 F2d 139, 142 (2d Cir 1930)
(defining the corporate "presence" standard as "morass"); Buddensick v Stateline Hotel,
Inc, 972 P2d 928 (Utah App 1998). The Buddensick court distilled the factors relevant to
the issue of whether general personal jurisdiction exists to include whether the corporate
defendant is:
1. engaged in business in this state;
2. licensed to do business in this state;
3. owning, leasing, or controlling property (real or personal) or assets in this state;
4. maintaining employees, offices, agents, or bank accounts in this state;
5. present in that shareholders reside in this state;
6. maintaining phone or fax listings within this state;
7. advertising or soliciting business in this state;
8. traveling to this state by way of salespersons, etc.;
9. paying taxes in this state;
10. visiting potential customers in this state;
11. recruiting employees in the state;
12. generating a substantial percentage of its national sales through revenue generated
from in-state customers.
Id at 930-31.
92 See, for example, Myers v Mooney Aircraft, Inc, 240 A2d 505, 509 (Pa 1967) (inter-
preting "doing business" under then extant Pennsylvania corporation law, Section 1101,
subdivision C of the Business Corporation Law of 1933 as amended.) The statute provided
that:
For the purposes of determining jurisdiction of courts within this Com-
monwealth, the entry of any corporation into this Commonwealth for the
doing of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecu-
niary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act
in this Commonwealth for such purpose, with the intention of thereby ini-
tiating a series of such acts, shall constitute "doing business."
93 Hutchinson, 45 F2d at 142 (struggling to set a standard for doing-business jurisdic-
tion).
94 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U Chi Legal
F 119, 130 (noting that general jurisdiction is "necessary to cover for a major deficiency in
specific jurisdiction").
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ing-business jurisdiction may provide a forum by necessity where
multiple defendants are involved. 5
Moreover, doing-business jurisdiction generally does little
harm. Most defendants are domestic and will have to defend
somewhere in the United States anyway. Furthermore, if most
cases are somewhat related to the defendant's contacts, then per-
haps nothing more than continuous and systematic contacts is
needed for a result that is generally reasonable, even if not fully
supported by current constitutional theory.
Courts confronting truly unrelated cases-cases that might
justifiably be covered under this doctrine-can use the separate
"reasonableness" prong or forum non conveniens to avoid unjust
results." So as the cases play out, the doctrine often operates in
95 See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 US at 419 n 13 (1984) (declining to apply the
doctrine of jurisdiction "by necessity" as an alternative to the minimum contacts analysis
to justify the assertion of jurisdiction over additional defendants as long as all defendants
might be sued together in another country). Compare the proposed Hague Convention,
which allows jurisdiction over additional defendants under a looser standard. Hague Draft
Proposal at Art 14(1)(a)-(b) (cited in note 4):
A plaintiff bringing an action against a defendant in a court of the State
in which that defendant is habitually resident may also proceed in that
court against other defendants not habitually resident in the State if-(a)
the claims against the defendant habitually resident in that State and
the other defendants are so closely connected that they should be adjudi-
cated together to avoid a serious risk of inconsistent judgments, and (2)
as to each defendant not habitually resident in that State, there is a sub-
stantial connection between the State and the dispute involving the de-
fendant.
96 See text accompanying notes 88, 144-49 (addressing the use of forum non conven-
iens). See also Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476-77 (1985) (introducing a
separate reasonableness standard for personal jurisdiction); Asahi Metal Industry Co, Ltd
v Superior Court of California, 480 US 102, 114 (1987) (refusing to hear a third-party
claim against a foreign defendant at the place of injury when the court's assertion of juris-
diction was unreasonable). For lower court cases relying on the "reasonableness" standard
as a basis for denying general jurisdiction despite heavy contacts, see, for example, Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co v Robertson-Ceco Corp, 84 F3d 560, 565-66, 573-75 (2d Cir
1996) (finding that defendant's four million dollars in sales in forum over six years, com-
bined with forum visits, advertising, provision of product support, and deliberate targeting
of forum firms as sales prospects satisfied the minimum contacts requirement, but that
general jurisdiction was nevertheless unreasonable because forum had no interest in
dispute); Follette v Clairol, Inc, 829 F Supp 840, 846-48 (W D La 1993) (finding that al-
though Wal-Mart corporation operated out of physical places of business in forum, general
jurisdiction was unreasonable outside the place of incorporation or principal place of busi-
ness when forum had no interest in the suit). For further commentary on the reasonable-
ness standard, see B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 Tulane L Rev
1097, 1129-41 (1990) (suggesting that the "reasonableness" test is appropriately used in
general jurisdiction analysis); Linda Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior
Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22
Rutgers L J 569, 579-83 (1991) (criticizing modern use of "reasonableness test" because
such reasonableness inquiries might lead to jurisdiction even in absence of minimum
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reality as something of a specific jurisdiction catchall for commer-
cial defendants.
In sum, we sacrifice the perfect for the good-sacrifice theo-
retical coherence, clarity and foreseeability for what may amount
to reasonable results in individual cases. What other cases have
taken away,97 a practical use of doing-business jurisdiction can
restore.
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF A LOOSE APPROACH:
FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
But we cannot blithely accept this status quo. If we are to
continue to ground personal jurisdiction on the Constitution (that
is, until Professor Borchers's revolution comes),9" we need a per-
suasive theoretical basis for doing-business jurisdiction that ei-
ther justifies its extreme breadth or limits its boundaries, and our
decisions should fairly reflect whatever principle we adopt. These
results should also be reasonably predictable, giving defendants
notice of which commercial activities will expose them to a fo-
rum's plenary power.
A. The Impact on Foreign Defendants
We may never reach these goals, but circumstances may
force us to try, primarily because of the pressure put on us by for-
eign defendants appalled to find that general jurisdiction expo-
sure is the price of doing regular business in U.S. markets. Al-
though general jurisdiction may be unfair in many cases, it is es-
pecially unfair when exercised over foreign business enterprises
for several related reasons.
1. Lowered foreseeability.
Citizens of countries that do not allow general activities-
based jurisdiction over defendants where they are doing-
business-that is, citizens of almost every country in the
contacts and will lead to increased transaction costs inappropriate for issues which need to
be determined efficiently at the outset of litigation).
97 See Asahi, 480 US at 109-13 (suggesting that defendant component part manufac-
turer may need more than knowledge that product is being sold in forum); World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 US at 299 (denying jurisdiction at place of tortious injury). See generally
Borchers, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 130-32 (cited in note 94) (describing deficiencies in the
current specific jurisdiction doctrine).
98 Borchers, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 139 (cited in note 94) (suggesting that the Su-
preme Court "dramatically relax the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction").
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world 99-may not expect or foresee it, and will perceive it as ex-
traordinarily unfair. This problem is compounded by the lack of a
uniform national rule clearly describing the extent to which non-
domestic entities may be exposed to such jurisdiction.
2. Unpredictability.
This factor presents a problem for both domestic and foreign
defendants. Even if a corporation is aware of the existence of do-
ing-business jurisdiction, the case law is so unsettled that few
companies can predict when and to what extent they may be sub-
ject to such jurisdiction. Results can vary both state by state and
case by case. Given this uncertainty and the expense of litigating
jurisdiction, especially for smaller enterprises that may not have
regular experience with litigating in the United States, busi-
nesses may choose not to assert a defense at all, °° or may choose
not to appeal a negative ruling at the trial level-hence, the in
terrorem effect Professor Juenger so aptly describes.1 1
3. More significant exposure.
For an American defendant, being subjected to doing-
business jurisdiction means, at worst, having to defend in an ad-
ditional American state. A change of law may be a significant
risk,10 2 but otherwise the system is very much the same. A foreign
defendant, on the other hand, is subject to jurisdiction in what is
often a dramatically different judicial system a long distance from
home. Unless it has been engaged in substantial commercial ac-
tivities here for a long time, it is likely to be unfamiliar with our
litigation system and will by definition be seen as an "outsider."
In fact, the whole notion of "insiderness" may play out differently
99 But see Linda J. Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved?: A Per-
spective from the United States, in John J. Barcel6, III and Kevin M. Clermont, eds, A
Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments: Lessons from The Hague (forthcoming Kluwer
Intl 2001) (noting that England and Japan also permit form of "doing business" jurisdic-
tion over unrelated claims in some circumstances).
100 See Gordon letter (cited in note 88) (stating that multi-national corporate defen-
dants with world-wide sales increasingly elect to raise forum non conveniens and choice of
law rather than personal jurisdiction defenses: "Personal jurisdiction debate is a wonder-
ful activity for the classroom, but a timely and costly one for clients.").
101 Juenger, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 165 (cited in note 8).
102 See Silberman, 22 Rutgers L J at 589-90 (cited in note 96) (noting that courts may
use general jurisdiction as basis for applying forum law). But see Russell J. Weintraub,
Case Four: Choice of Law Theory, 29 New Eng L Rev 682, 683 (1995) (arguing that unlike
specific jurisdiction, the existence of general jurisdiction based on systematic and continu-
ous contacts should not give the forum the power to apply its own law).
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for foreign companies that are not well integrated into American
commercial life.10 3
Because of the heightened fairness problems present when
general jurisdiction is exercised over foreign corporations, it
would seem to follow that if we are going to curtail general doing-
business jurisdiction anywhere, it should be here."° And yet there
is a paradox: the fairness problems may be greater, but the needs
of domestic plaintiffs also increase.
For Americans suing Americans, if general jurisdiction is re-
fused, there is always an alternate forum within the same sys-
tem, the defendant's home. When suing a foreign enterprise,
unless the suit fits into our unsettled but potentially narrow defi-
nition of specific jurisdiction, there will be no domestic jurisdic-
tion at all. Doing-business jurisdiction gives U.S. courts the
power to decide claims arising elsewhere, and jurisdiction over
additional defendants in a dispute that may originally be based
on specific jurisdiction. It also enhances the possibility that a de-
103 If political theory suggests that it is fair to treat such a commercial enterprise as an
"insider," are there differences to be taken into account when that "insider" is directed by
individuals from another country? And if so, what are we to do with companies that do
their business through subsidiaries in the U.S. or that employ U.S. citizens? Should this
matter? If so, how? Compare Cebik, 1998 Ann Surv Am L at 43-44 (cited in note 7) (argu-
ing that it is difficult to explain how a foreign corporation could ever be a political insider).
104 See Silberman, 28 Tex Intl L J at 506 (cited in note 55) (noting that modern Su-
preme Court decisions and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations have raised the
question of whether the "due process standards play out differently when foreign defen-
dants are involved"). See also id at 509 (citations omitted):
Asahi [ ] cannot be read as intended for application in international cases
alone. Interestingly, however, in their Asahi amici curiae brief, the
American Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom and the Confed-
eration of British Industry did urge a specialized protective jurisdictional
standard for foreign defendants. Moreover, the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 421 identified a "reason-
ableness" standard limiting jurisdiction to adjudicate and explained that
the principle was analogous to the "reasonableness" principle adopted in
jurisdiction to prescribe cases in § 403. Section 403 makes clear that the
"reasonableness" principle operates as a quite distinct principle of inter-
national relations law. The architect of these Restatement sections has
himself intimated that the "reasonableness" standard of Asahi should
also be understood in this manner.
But see id at 511:
When foreign defendants enter the United States market in the same way
as their American competitors, it is not clear why they should not answer
in the United States forum or just what their special claim is. Indeed, if
the foreign defendant selling into the United States may avoid answering
in the United States, the United States plaintiff will lose the convenience
of litigating in its home state and will also face the added inconvenience
of litigating in a foreign and unfamiliar forum abroad.
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fendant will not fight an expensive personal jurisdiction battle at
either the trial or appellate level. °5
4. Systemic differences.
Systemic differences also cause problems of a different sort.
Plaintiffs obtain greater advantages in U.S. courts such as jury
trials, contingent fees for their lawyers, broader discovery rules,
and broader substantive laws."6 It is difficult for potential tort
defendants from foreign countries to contract around this prob-
lem. 0
7
5. Can foreign corporations ever be "insiders"?
It is hard to know what we should do in this difficult situa-
tion in which our national interests conflict with the interests of
other countries. If the "insider" theory is to work, general juris-
diction should only be exercised over defendants with enough ties
to the forum, and enough clout within the forum, so that the costs
of subjecting them to plenary forum power on any cause of action
are not externalized. Otherwise, the political theory supporting
general doing-business jurisdiction fails.
It is probably no accident that true outsiders-that is, foreign
commercial actors rather than domestic defendants-have raised
the first significant challenge to this form of jurisdiction. Anyone
who wonders why the domestic defense bar does not jump on the
bandwagon might consider this fact: of those reported cases find-
ing general jurisdiction over defendants," 8 a significant number
of them were commercial suits brought by American business
entities, not consumer suits brought by individuals.' 9 Like other
105 See Markus interview (cited in note 89).
106 See Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course: Add-
ing a Comparative Dimension, 28 Vand J Transnatl L 389, 396 (1995) (noting advantages
to plaintiffs in the American judicial system).
107 Compare Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001
U Chi Legal F 1, 24-25 (theorizing general jurisdiction in terms of contract and implied
consent is problematic because such jurisdiction necessarily includes potential tort suits
"which are not usually governed by explicit or even implied contracts that select the juris-
diction").
108 See note 80.
109 See, for example, Shaheen Sports, Inc v Asia Insurance Co, Ltd, 89 F Supp 2d 500
(S D NY 2000) (involving a suit brought by an American corporation and foreign shipper
suing foreign insurer of damaged shipment); ESI, Inc v Coastal Corp, 61 F Supp 2d 35 (S
D NY 1999) (involving a suit brought by an American corporation against foreign utilities
companies over disputed share of profits); First American Corp v Price Waterhouse LLP,
988 F Supp 353 (S D NY 1997) (involving an attempt by an American corporation to com-
pel discovery from foreign entities for suit against a third party); WMW Machinery, Inc v
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domestic plaintiffs, American business enterprises benefit from
the role that our broad doing-business rule plays in our overall
jurisdictional structure.
6. The risks of using doing-business jurisdiction to decide
internet cases.
Another problem that this Symposium underscores is the
risk that American states may inappropriately use their general
jurisdiction powers to reach defendants using the internet for
commercial activities. Unlike the specific jurisdiction question, a
state can decide that it has doing-business jurisdiction without
any consideration of its regulatory authority over the claim pre-
sented. Because the standard is so ill-defined, a court can focus
merely on the presence of "continuous and systematic" contacts,
find "general" jurisdiction, and compel the defendant to respond
to the state's regulatory authority. In sum, the mere existence of
this overbroad general jurisdiction power can undercut whatever
carefully-designed standard we might develop for determining
when specific jurisdiction exists over global commercial activity
that causes some effect within a particular nation.
While the state must theoretically apply appropriate choice
of law rules, the fact that the defendant is appearing in its court
may contribute to the state's perception that it has the power to
apply its own laws. Without any of the checks supplied by the
considerations that play a role in determining that specific juris-
diction exists, serious regulatory overreaching can result."'
Werkzeugmaschinenhandel GMBH Im Aufbau, 960 F Supp 734 (S D NY 1997) (involving a
suit brought by two American corporations against a German corporation, a German gov-
ernment agency, and the liquidator of a former East German government agency, seeking
to recover for breach of joint venture and commercial agency agreements under which
American corporations were to distribute machine tools made in Germany); Future Tech
International, Inc, v Toe Il Media, Ltd, 944 F Supp 1538 (S D Fla 1996) (involving a suit
between an American corporation and a foreign defendant for breach of contract and
fraud); Summit Machine Tool Manufacturing Corp v Warren Transport, Inc, 920 F Supp
722 (S D Tex 1996) (involving a suit by an American corporation against a foreign defen-
dant over a transport claim); American Cyanamid Co v Eli Lilly and Co, 903 F Supp 781
(D NJ 1995) (involving a suit by an American drug company seeking a declaratory judg-
ment nullifying an alleged patent infringement against a foreign drug company and a
domestic competitor); Anglo American Insurance Group, Calfed, Inc, 899 F Supp 1070 (S D
NY 1995) (involving a suit between an American company and a foreign defendant for
breach of contract); Georgia-Pacific Corp v Multimark's International, Ltd, 706 NYS2d 82
(App Div 2000) (involving a suit between an American corporation and foreign defendants
for breach of contract).
110 In the recent cases finding jurisdiction over foreign defendants discussed earlier, I
did not find any cases in which the claim presented involved solely the defendant's inter-
net activity, but such cases are bound to arise in the future. See note 81.
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B. The Hague Proposal
The current Hague proposal..1 would resolve many of the
problems foreign defendants face by disallowing all forms of gen-
eral doing-business jurisdiction in transnational cases. This
would reduce the legitimate concerns of foreign defendants, but it
would leave Americans without access to local fora for some cases
that have traditionally, and perhaps properly, been decided here.
No matter how generously the proposal's language permitting
jurisdiction is read,"2 or how few additional due process limits
are imposed by the Supreme Court,' under the current proposal
plaintiffs would not be able to sue foreign defendants in the
United States on claims having no relationship to the defendant's
domestic activities."4 This result is, of course, viewed by many
other nations as a reasonable limit on what is perceived as an
exorbitant exercise of jurisdiction,"' but we are probably not
ready to go that far in curtailing this jurisdiction."'
Professor Linda Silberman has proposed a compromise provi-
sion for the Hague proposal. Doing-business jurisdiction would be
preserved in the "gray area" of permitted jurisdiction exercises" '
111 See Hague Draft Proposal (cited in note 4).
112 See generally id at Arts 3-22.
113 For an extended discussion of how possible adoption of the Hague Proposal in the
United States might be affected by American constitutional law, see Symposium, Could A
Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doctrine?, 61 Albany L Rev 1159 (1998).
Another recent symposium focusing on the Hague proposal is Symposium, Enforcing
Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 Brooklyn J Intl L 1 (1998).
114 See Hague Draft Proposal at Art 18(1) (cited in note 4) (prohibiting jurisdiction
predicated on "the carrying on of commercial activities by the defendant in that State,
except where the dispute is directly related to those activities").
115 Although the Preliminary Draft itself does not use the term "exorbitant" when
describing the types of jurisdiction prohibited in Article 18, the phrase appears in the
accompanying report. See Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commis-
sion on the Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters 75-76 ("Report on Preliminary Draft"), available online at
<ftp://hcch.net/doc/jdgmpdll.doc> (visited Oct 22, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
116 After all, consider the relative political power of the Americans who travel abroad
or engage in international business; one might expect significant resistance to such a
change since they would be among those significantly hurt by it.
117 Article 17 of the proposed Convention permits signatory states to apply their own
national rules of jurisdiction as long as they are not prohibited under Article 18. See
Hague Draft Proposal at Art 17 (cited in note 4). This jurisdiction is referred to as existing
in the "gray area." Linda J. Silberman and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge
for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, An International Treaty, and an Ameri-
can Statute, 75 Ind L J 635, 641 (2000) (referring to areas of permitted jurisdiction deline-
ated by Article 17 as being in the "middle" or "gray area"). The limited form of doing-
business jurisdiction outlined by Professor Silberman would be permitted under this Arti-
cle since it is excepted from the bases of prohibited jurisdiction listed in Article 18. See
note 118.
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in countries "where the defendant has a branch office or where
the defendant's activity in the forum is evidence of a substantial
presence there, and the plaintiff is habitually resident in the fo-
rum state."'18 While her proposal limits jurisdiction to claims
brought by local residents, removing many cases from the reach
of general jurisdiction, the "substantial presence" standard ap-
plied to defendants would continue to impose unpredictability
and costly litigation on foreign defendants. It remains to be seen
whether this proposal will be considered an acceptable compro-
mise. It may well be that unless doing-business jurisdiction re-
mains entirely in the "gray area," the Hague proposal will not be
accepted by the United States, and other countries may feel
equally strongly about keeping all doing-business jurisdiction in
the forbidden zone. 119
V. IF NOT HAGUE, WHAT?
Even if we do not achieve a successful convention through the
Hague, the problems raised by doing-business jurisdiction re-
main. We have used it regularly for more than a century. Doing-
business jurisdiction plays a vital role in resolving multiparty
disputes, and situates some cases in fora that might well be rea-
sonable although the jurisdictional exercise would not pass con-
stitutional muster under current specific-jurisdiction case law.
Doing-business jurisdiction thus provides a practical solution to
thorny constitutional debates. Unless the definition of "substan-
tial" contacts is spelled out with more clarity and is significantly
limited, however, doing-business jurisdiction will continue to cre-
118 Professor Silberman noted that:
Article 18 could be modified to prohibit jurisdiction on the basis of the
"carrying on of commercial activity by the defendant when the activity
did not give rise to the claim" except where the defendant has a branch
office or where the defendant's activity in the forum is evidence of a sub-
stantial presence there, and the plaintiff is habitually resident in the fo-
rum state.
Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved? (cited in note 99).
119 See Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International
Law, U.S. Dept of State, to Alasdair Wallace, Head of International and Common Law
Services Division, Lord Chancellor's Dept, United Kingdom (Sept 10, 2000) [on file with U
Chi Legal F] (stating that "U.S. bar will be extremely critical" of any convention that
would not allow doing-business general jurisdiction "to continue in the gray area as a
matter of national law"). Compare Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the
Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell L Rev 89, 115-16 (1999) (suggesting that "doing business" is a
"tired old doctrine" that is offensive to Europeans and arguing that we should be willing to
give it up).
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ate an unreasonable risk for defendants engaging in commerce
with United States citizens. Fairness dictates the development of
a more principled approach, in which we set a more coherent
standard for doing-business jurisdiction, at least insofar as it
reaches foreign defendants. We might approach the task of find-
ing a core rationale and developing a predictable practice in one
of several different ways.
A. Clarify the Doctrine: Direct Approach
Obviously an accepted and adequately-grounded theory could
help resolve the uncertainty about the type of activities sufficient
for the constitutional exercise of general jurisdiction by a state
over all defendants. However, as discussed above, the Court has
not indicated any inclination to flesh out the doctrine.12 ° Its ap-
proval of service jurisdiction in Burnham has severely reduced
the likelihood that it will develop a unified theory for general ju-
risdiction. Short of overruling the case, which is not likely, the
Court could at best articulate a standard for doing-business ju-
risdiction consistent with the International Shoe and Keeton
dicta,121 indicating whether a local physical presence is always
enough and developing some articulable test for determining the
situations in which a business's activities outside the forum, en-
gaged in directly or through a third party, would be sufficient to
justify doing-business jurisdiction.122
A key component of this approach would entail clarifying the
role that the claim itself should play in the doing-business in-
quiry. The Court should emphasize the dispute-blind nature of
general jurisdiction and remind courts that jurisdiction should
not be exercised under the "general" or "doing-business" rubric
unless the court has determined that the defendant's ties to the
forum are such that jurisdiction exists without regard to the na-
ture of the claim asserted.
120 See notes 34-40 and 49-60.
121 See text accompanying notes 57-60.
122 Developing such a theory is hard enough when considering solely American defen-
dants; it becomes even more difficult when taking account of foreign defendants. One is
tempted, at this point, to welcome Professor Borchers's revolution with open arms. See




B. Develop the Doctrine Incrementally
At the opposite end of the continuum, absent a clarifying the-
ory, several smaller steps might be taken to develop and identify
the values behind dispute-blind jurisdiction.
1. Remove the claim as a factor in the decision.
Even without guidance from the Supreme Court concerning
the theoretical basis for doing-business jurisdiction, the lower
courts could significantly reduce the confusion and unpredictabil-
ity of this form of jurisdiction by making the jurisdiction decision
only after considering one or more hypothetical cases against the
same defendant involving geographically distant disputes, wholly
unrelated to the defendant's forum contacts. A court should spe-
cifically consider whether it would have trouble asserting juris-
diction over such unrelated cases. If it sensed that it would gen-
erally dismiss such suits for lack of substantial contacts, or on
reasonableness or forum non conveniens grounds, the court
should recognize that a finding of jurisdiction in the case before it
would be based not on principles of general, but of specific, juris-
diction. In other words, it would not have a regulatory relation-
ship with the defendant sufficient to justify jurisdiction over any
and all claims, but only of claims with some relationship to the
defendant's forum activities.
Instituting such an approach could be done easily, by any
court, since it would be merely applying the constitutional theory
behind general jurisdiction. In time other courts might follow
suit, leading to a gradual reduction in doing-business jurisdiction.
However, this solution is not fully satisfactory for two reasons.
First, while eliminating the most extreme misuses of doing-
business jurisdiction, it would not resolve the theoretical uncer-
tainty about the basis for doing-business general jurisdiction
where it continues to exist. More troubling, courts might not be
willing to use this approach, even if it leads to a practice more
consistent with the true constitutional contours of general juris-
diction, because they would be limiting the reach of their own
state's jurisdiction, often in cases that bear some relationship to
the defendant's forum activities. Unless our specific jurisdiction
doctrine is modified to permit jurisdiction to be found more easily
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over a broader scope of "related" claims it is unlikely that courts
will want to put this suggestion into practice.
123
2. Find principles in unrelated past cases.
We might also arrive at a better theoretical understanding of
the basis for true dispute-blind jurisdiction by looking at past de-
cisions. The search should be limited to cases finding or denying
general jurisdiction in which the claim was indeed completely
unrelated to the defendant's forum contacts.2 4 Although uncover-
ing such cases would be a tedious process, they would reveal a
great deal about when states feel that a nonresident business
entity should be treated like an "insider" for any and all judicial
purposes.
Another possibility is that we will find few such cases, which
would confirm the perception that courts use doing-business ju-
risdiction primarily for cases in which the claim is somehow re-
lated to defendants' forum activities, but specific jurisdiction is
unavailable under current doctrine. If general jurisdiction is used
primarily in these situations-at the margins of specific jurisdic-
tion-we might wonder whether the general-specific dichotomy is
in fact meaningful, or whether some other approach to jurisdic-
tion is preferable. '25
C. Choose an Arbitrary Cut-Off
A third approach would be to develop an arbitrary cutoff that
would allow some predictable bases for general jurisdiction, but
limit its scope, thus reducing confusion and overreaching.
123 As Allan Stein points out, it often takes parents-or in this case, the Supreme
Court-to teach us to "keep our elbows in." Allan R. Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From
Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U Chi Legal F 373, 394 (discussing the need for sensitiv-
ity and self-restraint among members of any legal network).
124 A distinction between treatment of American and foreign defendants might also be
revealed.
125 See William M. Richman, Review Essay, Part I-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Ac-
tions; Part I-A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific
Jurisdiction, 72 Cal L Rev 1328, 1336-46 (1984) (proposing that the categories be supple-
mented with a sliding-scale model that examines both the extent of the defendant's forum
contacts and their relationship to the plaintiffs claim). See generally Redish, 38 Jurimet J
575 (cited in note 34) (proposing that the Court abandon purposeful availment standard




1. The branch office as a doctrinal break point.
We could return to the original notion that any defendant
operating out of an office within a state is subject to general ju-
risdiction, and make that the sine qua non of doing-business ju-
risdiction. The standard would be fairly clear despite some defini-
tional problems, and it would be limited. A similar provision for
specific jurisdiction is part of the Hague proposal,'26 indicating
that the presence of a physical office carries jurisdictional signifi-
cance within the international community.
However, given the scope of our traditional doing-business
jurisdiction, many Americans might find it difficult to accept the
notion that a physical office, by itself, should separate some de-
fendants from others engaged in significantly more substantial
commerce in the state. It is unlikely that such a limitation would
sit well with the American bar. For example, why should a small
Kansas bicycle repair shop owner who opens a second store in a
shopping mall across the border in Missouri be subject to jurisdic-
tion in Missouri on any cause of action, while another Kansas
corporation with multiple stores near the border and millions of
dollars in annual sales to Missouri citizens, is not? Granted,
opening a local shop indicates a physical intent to do steady busi-
ness within the forum, and the shop owner will receive some ad-
ditional benefits in terms of the protection of the state's police
powers; however it is not clear why this activity in Missouri
should justify the exercise of Missouri's regulatory power over all
claims that might be asserted against the bike shop owner but
not over all claims asserted against the Kansas corporation.'27
2. Adopt a national standard forbidding general jurisdiction
over foreign defendants.
We might simply develop a national rule for doing-business
jurisdiction over foreign defendants. There is much to recommend
126 See Hague Draft Proposal at Art 9 (cited in note 4). Although the dispute need not
arise within the forum, it must relate directly to the activity of the "branch, agency or
establishment in the forum." See id. The Preliminary Draft also offers optional language
that would extend this specific jurisdiction to other forms of "regular commercial activity."
Id. See also Nygh and Pocar, Report on Preliminary Draft at 56 (cited in note 115) (dis-
cussing ramifications of "regular commercial activity" proposal).
127 See, for example, Coastal Video Communications, Corp v The Staywell Corp, 59 F
Supp 2d 562, 571 (E D Va 1999) ("In traditional terms, the placing of a store or salesmen
in a state is not sufficient to confer general jurisdiction over a defendant without some
evidence that the store or salesmen actually generated sufficient sales in the forum state
for the contact to be considered continuous and systematic.").
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this approach. If a Hague judgments convention carrying some
limitation on general jurisdiction in international cases were rati-
fied by Congress, it is very likely that the Supreme Court would
support the result.12 Hence this change could be made without
interfering with the states' and federal courts' ability to exercise
broader general jurisdiction over American defendants. The Su-
preme Court has already indicated in Asahi Metal Industry, Co,
Ltd v Superior Court of California"9 that a fairly high "reason-
ableness" standard may apply in suits against foreign defen-
dants, 3 ' so such a step would be consistent with current constitu-
tional theory. Furthermore, because few foreign countries use any
form of general doing-business jurisdiction,' joining in such a
convention would be an appropriate act of international comity.
There are obvious problems with a national rule prohibiting
dispute-blind jurisdiction against foreign defendants. If such ju-
risdiction were completely banned, many cases routinely heard in
American courts would be barred unless the court could establish
specific jurisdiction. Under the principles of World-Wide Volks-
wagen".2 and Asahi,"3 specific jurisdiction would be restricted in
ways that it is not restricted in other countries,"' and would often
pose difficult analytical questions."'
128 See Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 Al-
bany L Rev 1161, 1175 (1998):
If a judgments convention actually emerges from the negotiation process,
commands Executive assent, is ratified by two thirds of the Senate, and-
presumably-is implemented by federal legislation that passes both
Houses of Congress, it is hard to imagine the Court not giving consider-
able weight to the judgment of its coordinate branches.
129 480 US 102 (1987).
130 Id at 114 (holding jurisdiction over foreign defendant unreasonable on facts of case
regardless of whether minimum contacts exist).
131 The Restatement of Foreign Relations states that in international litigation,
"jurisdiction based on service of process on a person only transitorily in the territory of the
state ... is not generally acceptable under international law." Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law § 421 comment e (1987).
132 444 US 286 (1980).
133 See id at 295-97 (refusing to find jurisdiction in state of injury unless the suit
meets the due process standard of foreseeability there, namely, that "the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court there"); Asahi, 480 US at 114 (finding jurisdiction unconstitu-
tional over a third-party claim asserted against a foreign manufacturer at the place of
consumer injury where such exercise was unreasonable on the facts of the case).
134 For example, European countries do not have a "purposeful availment" require-
ment, so claims can be heard where the tortious act occurs or where the injury is suffered.
See Russell J. Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judgments
Convention, 61 Albany L Rev 1269, 1271 (1998) (stating that Europeans lack this re-
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Despite these short-term difficulties, forcing our courts to
focus solely on the specific jurisdiction question might result, in
the long run, in far clearer and more useful rules for specific ju-
risdiction. The Supreme Court might ultimately answer the ques-
tion that it did not answer in Helicopteros Nacionales-whether
Texas had sufficient contacts with defendant to decide the claim
before it, even if it did not have enough contacts to decide any
claim presented against the defendant.136
Confronting these questions, which are similar to jurisdic-
tional questions addressed by our international trading partners,
would encourage us to develop more internationally-consistent
norms. Of course, to the extent that the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution limits permissible jurisdiction in the United States,
we would not follow international patterns perfectly.13 ' However,
the Supreme Court might, as some commentators suggest,'38 ul-
timately be persuaded to overrule prior case law inconsistent
with international specific jurisdiction standards.
Still, a total bar on general jurisdiction over foreign busi-
nesses would completely prohibit claims by American plaintiffs
injured abroad, which would leave a serious jurisdiction gap. The
quirement but might not object to adding such a requirement to the next proposed draft of
the Hague convention).
135 For example, the Court has failed to establish clear guidelines concerning the type
of conduct and knowledge needed by a component part manufacturer before it will be said
to have established minimum contacts with a state where its product reaches the con-
sumer. Compare Asahi, 480 US at 112 (O'Connor plurality) ("The placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.") with id at 117-21 (Brennan concurring) (seeing "no
need" for an additional showing of purposeful direction towards the forum once the defen-
dant has placed the product into the stream of commerce). See also Russell J. Weintraub,
A Map out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 UC Davis L Rev 531, 531-32 (1995)
(threshold determination of personal jurisdiction has become one of the most litigated
issues in state and federal courts; deference to the convenience of nonresident defendants
has frustrated the reasonable interests of plaintiffs and their home states). See also note
83.
136 See 466 US at 415 & n 10 (holding that the Court need not address the question of
specific jurisdiction since the parties did not argue that the claim was related to defen-
dant's forum contacts).
137 For an extensive discussion of the variances between American jurisdiction rules
and those of the European Community and of the possibility of bridging those differences
through a treaty, see generally Symposium, 61 Albany L Rev 1159 (cited in note 113).
138 Weintraub, 61 Albany L Rev at 1273 (cited in note 134), citing Carol S. Bruch,
Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine: Fitting International Shoe to Family Law, 28
UC Davis L Rev 1047, 1058 (1995) (stating that "we can expect the Court to understand
and defer to well-thought-out jurisdictional schemes, even when they deviate from an-
nounced Supreme Court doctrine"); Friedrich K. Juenger, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 1044
(cited in note 90) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court "might well be prepared" to "coun-
tenance a change of jurisdictional bases by treaty").
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compromise approach suggested by Professor Silberman 19 would
permit some of these cases to be heard in American courts.14 ° Un-
der the narrowest version of her proposal, a country could exer-
cise general jurisdiction over a suit brought by one of its habitual
residents if the defendant has a branch office there.'
Despite its narrowness, this version of her proposed excep-
tion has many strengths. First it would be very predictable. Sec-
ond, it would create a local forum for some cases that our citizens
might find hard to give up. Furthermore, since other countries
would not need to recognize such judgments,' this form of juris-
diction would be used only when easy enforcement is likely avail-
able, either in the forum or elsewhere; for example, if the defen-
dant has assets in the United States.
However, unless Professor Silberman's broader proposal (al-
lowing general jurisdiction where defendant has "substantial"
ties) is adopted, the exception would not apply to most recent
cases finding general jurisdiction over foreign defendants,' This
gap would create a serious problem for United States businesses
that regularly seek to sue foreign business entities in American
courts. Nevertheless, this doctrinal narrowing is worth the loss,
since courts would be compelled to address and refine specific
jurisdiction issues in many cases involving foreign defendants.
This approach seems to be the best compromise. It restricts
doing-business jurisdiction over defendants abroad without un-
settling doing-business jurisdiction as it is practiced against
139 See notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
140 Article 18 could be modified, Silberman suggests, to prohibit jurisdiction on the
basis of the:
carrying on of commercial activity by the defendant when the activity did
not give rise to the claim "except where the defendant has a branch office
or where the defendant's activity in the forum is evidence of a substantial
presence there, and the plaintiff is habitually resident in the forum
state."
Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved? (cited in note 99).
141 Id.
142 The provision would simply remove this basis for general jurisdiction from the
"prohibited bases ofjurisdiction" in Article 18 of the proposed convention. See Hague Draft
Proposal at Art 18 (cited in note 4). See also Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of
American Law in the Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 Albany L Rev 1283, 1290-
91 (1998) (criticizing Americans for insisting that some bases of jurisdiction be put into a
"gray" area allowing enforcement within the nation but not beyond, but recognizing that
this compromise may be necessary to achieve a convention signed by the United States).
143 Most of those cases involved claims that were somehow related to the defendant's
forum activities. Few of them involved a branch office operated by the defendant. See
notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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American defendants. Over time states might gradually adopt the
stricter standard for local cases as well. Equally important, more
experience in addressing specific jurisdiction questions in cases
where no branch office exists should result in better standards for
specific jurisdiction than those currently in place.
D. Use Ad Hoc Measures to Control General Jurisdiction
While a statute or treaty formally limiting general jurisdic-
tion over foreign defendants might be the best approach overall,
it is unlikely that we will happily give up our broad doing-
business jurisdiction. Therefore courts may elect to use such ad
hoc measures as the reasonableness standard,"' or unforeseeabil-
ity,'45 or forum non conveniens,146 to put a brake on this jurisdic-
tion with foreign defendants.
Because the unreasonableness test is already being used in
general jurisdiction cases involving American defendants,147 and
has the imprimatur of the Supreme Court,148 it is likely that this
is how most general jurisdiction cases will be approached in the
future: courts will assert general jurisdiction whenever they find
continuous and systematic contacts, but will dismiss any wholly-
unrelated cases on reasonableness grounds unless the defendant
has exceptionally long-term and substantial contacts.4
This approach might protect foreign defendants having little
litigation experience in the United States. However, this is the
144 See notes 147-48.
145 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 295-97 (refusing to assert jurisdiction in state
of injury unless defendant's connection with the forum makes litigation foreseeable there).
146 See note 88.
147 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v Robertson-Ceco Corp, 84 F3d 560, 568-69, 573-75
(2d Cir 1996) (upholding trial court's determination that forum had general jurisdiction
over American defendant but that suit should nevertheless be dismissed under unreason-
ableness prong of jurisdiction analysis).
148 See Asahi, 480 US at 113-16 (denying personal jurisdiction as unreasonable in suit
involving a foreign component part manufacturer).
149 There is nothing wrong with a court's finding general jurisdiction and then declin-
ing to hear the case before it on reasonableness grounds. This is likely to happen with
claims unrelated to the defendant's forum contacts because the forum is less likely to have
any interest in such a claim. See, for example, Metropolitan Life Insurance, 84 F3d at 573-
75 (finding general jurisdiction over claim unrelated to forum contacts but dismissing
because forum had no interest in the dispute). However, the point is that courts should not
find "general" jurisdiction in the first place unless the defendant's contacts with the state
are so strong that there is a state interest in deciding unrelated as well as related claims.
If a court would dismiss most unrelated claims against a defendant as "unreasonable," the
defendant does not have the kind of ties with the forum that are necessary for general
jurisdiction, since the point of general jurisdiction is that the state has sufficient interest
in the defendant to decide any and all claims against that defendant. See note 11.
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least attractive of our options, since it is not a national rule, and
forum-shopping incentives and confusion and unpredictability
would continue to thrive. Doing-business jurisdiction would re-
main as a halfway house between specific jurisdiction and the
Platonic version of general jurisdiction, catching those somewhat-
related cases that we want to decide which do not clearly fail un-
der specific jurisdiction standards.
E. Do Nothing
Finally, we can do absolutely nothing, continuing to use do-
ing-business jurisdiction as we now do. There are costs to busi-
nesses that cannot plan, or foresee when courts will find general
jurisdiction, but with respect to domestic claims against foreign
corporations, these costs are, for the most part, externalized.
Maintaining the status quo may be a self-interested and cynical
choice, but it is also a realistic one.
F. Recommendation: Some Special Treatment for
Foreign Defendants
Given this range of options, the most reasonable solution,
from the point of view of both theory and politics, is to abandon
our current broad general jurisdiction over foreign defendants. If
a compromise can be hammered out in the Hague negotiations
allowing us to retain general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
having a branch office in the country,150 at least as to claims of
American plaintiffs, we would have a workable approach to do-
ing-business jurisdiction. We could continue to exercise general
jurisdiction over foreign defendants in a limited set of circum-
stances, without any assurance that such judgments would be
enforced by other countries.
Restricting doing-business jurisdiction over foreign defen-
dants would compel courts to address important questions of spe-
160 Such a provision would allow us to exercise jurisdiction over such defendants. En-
forcement of any resultant judgment would depend on the presence of assets in the United
States or in the willingness of another nation to honor such a judgment, which would be
problematic in many places. See Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come?-The
Need for a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary
Judgments, 26 L & Pol in Intl Bus 79, 94-95 (1994) (describing recognition rules in foreign
countries that interfere with enforcement of American judgments abroad); Peter H. Pfund,
The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare a Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 24 Brooklyn J Intl L 7, 8-9 (1998) (if a foreign defendant does not have sufficient
assets in the United States, it may have trouble enforcing a U.S. judgment abroad).
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cific jurisdiction that have yet to be resolved. The result should be
the development of more robust and clearly-defined specific juris-
diction rules, which would then be applied to local as well as for-
eign defendants. We would "keep our elbows in," as Allan Stein so
aptly puts it,"' cooperating in creating the international jurisdic-
tional standards necessary for successful dispute resolution pro-
cedures in a globalized world.
Absent a Hague treaty, this recommendation will be more
difficult to put into place. If no treaty is involved, it would take
Congress or the Supreme Court to impose the same restrictions
on doing-business jurisdiction over foreign businesses, and the
likelihood of either body doing this absent the pressure of a com-
pleted international treaty is not great. Although the Supreme
Court might surprise us all by setting clearer limits on general
jurisdiction against foreign defendants, perhaps by ruling that it
is generally "unreasonable" to hold a foreign defendant subject to
general jurisdiction on an unrelated cause of action unless it has
a branch office in this country, it is unlikely that the Court would
be willing to adopt such a bright-line rule without considerable
pressure from various quarters.
Short of such a dramatic about-face, the best solution would
be for the Supreme Court to recognize, and insist that state and
federal courts recognize, that due process does not permit "gen-
eral" doing-business jurisdiction unless the state has such signifi-
cant ties with the forum that the court would feel equally justi-
fied in deciding a wholly-unrelated claim.'52 A clearer judicial ex-
ploration of the forum ties needed for general jurisdiction would
be tremendously helpful, but perhaps it is too much to ask.'53
CONCLUSION: SOLVING THE "DOING BUSINESS" PROBLEM
It seems every route of escape from the dilemma of our cur-
rent use of doing-business jurisdiction is blocked off. Courts will
continue use the theory to justify jurisdiction, generally over
cases related to the defendant's forum contacts, when it is easier
to find general jurisdiction than specific jurisdiction. This overuse
has led to much confusion about the nature of this form of juris-
151 Stein, 2001 U Chi L Rev at 394 (cited in note 123).
152 See Part V B 1.
153 Perhaps we can also do without it. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
Cal L Rev 953, 971 (1995) (stating that workable rules can be based on "incompletely
theorized agreements-agreements among people who disagree on questions of theory or
on fundamental values").
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diction and its role in our constitutional jurisdiction structure.
The old notion of the "branch office" is not sufficiently robust to
capture the ways that international actors structure their busi-
ness relationships, and it is unlikely that Americans will be will-
ing to limit "general" jurisdiction to such a norm. But coming up
with a different approach will take much thought about the na-
ture of a state's judicial relationship with remote commercial ac-
tors. Pressures from other countries are forcing us to reconsider
how far we should go in asserting such judicial jurisdiction on the
rest of the world, and the time has come to give up some of this
judicial power, as much as we might want to keep it for ourselves.
No matter what approach we take, this is not a problem that
can be easily solved. In this we can draw consolation from
Learned Hand, who wrote years ago:
None of this, and not all of it, seems to us a good reason
for drawing the defendant into a suit away from its home
state. In the end there is nothing more to be said than that
all the defendant's local activities, taken together, do not
make it reasonable to impose such a burden upon it. It is
fairer that the plaintiffs should go to Boston than that the
defendant should come here. Certainly such a standard is
no less vague than any that the courts have hitherto set
up; one may look from one end of the decisions to the other
and find no vade mecum.154
1'54 Hutchinson v Chase & Gilbert, Inc, 45 F2d 139, 142 (2d Cir 1930).
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